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Who is God and what is God ? is a question that
is raised by both religious and irreligious people
;
and most different answers are given. Every one
of us has perhaps his own and peculiar opinion
about God ; some of us are theists, some pantheists,
some atheists, and there are in the history of religion
and philosoph}', so far as I can judge, not two thinkers
who fully agree upon the subject. Shades of differ-
ences are visible everywhere.
I do not intend to discuss any one of the many
conceptions of God ; nor do I intend to preach either
Theism, or Atheism, or Pantheism. All I ask is the
use of the word God in the sense of "the ultimate
authority in conformity to which man regulates his
actions." Of those who allow their actions to be de-
termined by the first impulse that comes over them,
I would say, that whim is their God. Those who are
swayed by egotism, we say that self is their deity.
There are others whose sole principle of conduct is
the pursuit of pleasures : their God is happiness.
Others still may possess a moral ideal ; the endeavor
to be obedient to their duties : their God would be
duty.
After this preliminarj' definition of God, we put
the question : Is there any way of ascertaining the na-
ture of God, so that all men of different opinions may
be led to the recognition of one God, who is the only
true God, beside whom all other Gods are mere idols ?
In other words. Is the authority in conformity with
which man regulates his conduct merely his private
pleasure, is it purely subjective in its nature, or is it a
power that is above us, that is mightier than our-
selves, that enforces obedience and wrecks those who
dare to disregard it? Is that saying of Antisthenes
true, "The Gods of the people are many, but the God
of nature is one ?"
The answer to this question is simple, and can
easily be deduced from experience. I cannot at all
act as I please, but have to regulate my actions ac-
cording to the facts of nature. If I attempt to walk
on the water I shall sink ; if I try to fly from the top
of my house to the roof of my neighbor's house across
the street, I shall fall. Natural laws will not be altered
on my account, and I shall not be able to fashion
them so as to suit my purposes. However, I can
accommodate myself to the facts of nature, I can obey
the natural laws, and if I do so, it will be to my own
benefit. The more intimately man is acquainted with
nature, the more perfectly he adapts himself to the
order of nature, the wider will be his dominion. In
the measure in which he becomes more obedient to
the authority of natural laws, the more powerful, the
more independent, the more free will man be.
Schiller said :
" within your will let deity reside and God descendeth from his throne."
[Nehmt die Gottheit auf in euren Willen und sie steigt von ihrem Welten-
thron.]
The natural laws of the physical world, gravita-
tion, mechanical laws, physical laws, biological laws,
may appear to the present generation plain and pal-
pable facts of nature, yet it took centuries to sum up
the facts in laws and to state some of them in simple
terms. The men who succeeded in stating them in
simple terms were prophetic geniuses, such as Coper-
nicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, Huyghens, Darwin,
and others ; the results of their labors are discoveries
of a divine inspiration, and are a revelation of the
eternal and universal order of nature.
Besides the physical laws of nature, there are the
sociological laws that prevail in the higher kingdoms
of living organisms, and in the societies which greater
numbers of single individuals unite. Every one of
us is a member of a community ; and again all the
communities of human beings are closely bound to-
gether, however great the distance in which they
dwell, by certain relations, by common interests, and
mutual sympathies. These sociological laws are not
a product of well calculated intentions, but they are
of a natural growth ; the evolution of the social affairs
of mankind is deeply rooted in the conditions of
things.
Now every fact of science stated as a law has its
practical side ; it teaches us how to behave in certain
conditions. There is no knowledge but it can be
framed in the shape of a moral command. The tables
of arithmetic are mere statements of fact ; but every
one of them is a most valuable ethical law : it is a
guide for our actions and a rule of conduct.
Every child knows that the ethics of arithmetic
cannot be changed, it is a sovereign power above
us. Yet we can make that royal authority descend
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from its throne by obedience to its behests, we can
adapt our calculations to it, and thus we shall partake
of its sovereignty. The more accurately and the
purer truth dwells in our minds, the more will our
souls grow divine, and -the more will we bear in our-
selves the image of God. There is no knowledge
that does not make us purer, and no correct applica-
tion of knowledge that does not make us more divine.
But among all the natural laws that it behooves a
man to know and to obey, are the laws of human life,
the relations among human beings, and the aspira-
tions of human ideals. It is here where the revelation
of God appears in its grandest, its most beautiful, and
its holiest form.
How many people are there that understand that
these laws are no less cogent and irrefragable than
the laws of the multiplication tables ! How many
imagine that they can break these laws with impunity.
Let us do evil, they say, that good may come from it.
The prophet Hosea says : " People are destroyed
from lack of knowledge," and these words are true even
to-day. People injure themselves and others mostly
from ignorance and from ill-will, which is a necessary
result of ignorance. Would not the brute cease to be
brutish if it were endowed with human reason?
Let us open our eyes to see and prepare our minds
to learn the ordinances of the divine authority that
shapes the destinies of our life. The better we observe
them, the clearer we understand them, and the more
promptly we obey them, the sweeter will be the bless-
ings that come upon our lives, the greater will be the
advance of humanity, and the nobler will appear the
divinity of mankind.
THE DERIVATION OF THE WORD 'GOD.'
BY CALVIN THOMAS.
Readers of Matthew Arnold will recall the enter-
taining chapter of his book "God and the Bible," in
which he discourses upon "the God of Metaphysics."
Arnold here tells how, after being perplexed beyond
endurance by the philosophical jargon of 'essence,'
'being,' and so forth, he set out in desperation to find
some one who would tell him what ' being ' reall}' is.
Such a kind soul, so he sa3's, he found in the person
of the late Prof. Georg Curtius of Leipzig, whose
"Principles of Greek Etymology " gave him the as-
surance that the Indo-European root as, from which
'essence' is derived, meant originally 'to breathe'
and that the root ^>/n/, from which 'being' comes,
meant 'to grow.' And then follows some of Arnold's
inimitable persiflage at the expense of the metaphy-
sicians, the point of it all being to enforce the im-
portance of having clear ideas about the words one
uses and of not being deceived by high-sounding terms
which only represent the last stage in a process of ab-
straction that began with a concrete physical concept.
This point is certainly well taken ; one can freely
say ' amen ' to it even though he may think that Arnold
himself puts good counsel to a dubious use when he
makes it lead up to the proposition that "the Hebrew
people and Hebrew history iegin with a religion of
soberness and righteousnes," and then tries to per-
suade us that Israel's tribal God Jahveh was felt from
the beginning merely as an "Eternal not ourselves
that makes for righteousness." Beyond doubt a large
part of human disputing has underlying it a word not
clearly understood or used by the disputants in dif-
ferent senses. Hence arises, as all thoughtful persons
know, the importance of scrupulous care with regard
to the terms one uses in any discussion. At the same
time we should be on our guard against making too
much of an etymology. Etymology does not give us,
as the name implies, the 'true,' but only the original,
meaning of a word, and can never be a court of final
appeal against usage, which is itself the supreme ar-
biter. Thus if it were quite certain, instead of being
very uncertain, that the Indo-European root as, or as
we now write it es, originally meant 'to breathe,' that
certainly does not even tend to show that ontology is
humbug, any more than the original meaning of the
root l>/iu, whatever it may have been, can prove that
the abstract conception 'being' is worthless in phi-
losophy.
But while we should not appeal to etymology, or
should only appeal to it very cautiously, for the pur-
pose of discrediting any fact of usage, etymologj' has
an interest of its own and is often highly suggestive.
This is particularly apt to be the case with widely
disseminated culture-words that have a long and varied
history behind them. Let me illustrate this observation
by a brief inquiry into the origin of the word "god."
If we consult any of the older lexicographers we
shall find them, as a rule, taking it for granted that
'God' comes from 'good.' Thus Skinner (1671)
tells us that 'God' is 'good'; Bonus, quod dicit Bd-
num in abstracto. So in Bailej''s dictionary (I quote
from the late edition of 1763), we find the statement
that "'God' is a Saxon word which likewise signi-
fies 'good.'" "The same word," he adds, "passes
in both senses with only accidental variations through
all the Teutonic' dialects." This statement was
copied by Dr. Johnson, whose authority helped to
perpetuate the etymology. Subsequently we find it
in many places ; it is quoted without dissent in Rich-
ardson's dictionary, edition of 1863. So far as I have
noted Webster was one of the first to express doubts
j
with regard to this derivation. His comment was, as
'
far back as 1832, that the idea of naming 'God''
from 'goodness' was probably "remote from the.
rude conceptions of men in early ages. "
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To the scholarship of the present day, it is per-
haps hardly necessary to say, this etymology appears
quite out of the question. Webster's objection is
valid, and would be alone sufficient, but there is
another still more cogent, and that is the fact that
the words 'God' and 'good' are never identical, the
former having originally a short vowel, the other a
long. This was to Bailey an "accidental variation,"
not worth paying any attention to, but nowadays it is
a serious matter. As for the later and better author-
ities, they are for the most part non committal, and
treat the word as an unsolved puzzle. This is the
case, for example, with Skeat. Of late, however, a
derivation has been proposed which has already found
its way into some of the books, notably the admirable
German dictionary of Kluge, and which seems to me to
have everything in its favor. I proceed to explain it.
The word 'God,' be it observed first, is a Ger-
manic word ; it has no known cognate of similar
meaning in the Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, or any other
Indo-European language. (I pass by as untenable
the attempt of some to connect it with an alleged
Sanskrit gudha, meaning 'mystery,' or with a Persian
kodha, meaning ' master '). Our earliest acquaint-
ance with the word is naturally obtained from the
Gothic, where it is of frequent occurrence in the form
giith {(h as in thiii), which is in reality a neuter noun,
though it is used as a masculine when it refers to the
God of Christianity. It occurs also as a plural in the
form giida, e. g., in John 10, 34 : ik qath, gtida sijuth,
' I said, ye are gods. ' The d in g//da, as regularly be-
tween vowels, was pronounced as d/i, by which I mean
the English M in ///«. Now as this d/i regularly be-
comes t/i when brought to a position at the end of a
word, we readily conclude that the real gothic form of
the word was giidh. In compounds the stem of the
word appears both as gitda- {guda-hjus, ' godless,
')
and as gutha- {gutha-skaunei, ' form of God '). In
Old Icelandic the circumstances are almost exactly
parallel. The word appears in the form gudh, more
rarely godh, as a neuter, and usually in the plural, in
the sense of 'idol,' but is treated as a masculine when
applied to the God of Chistianity. As to the Old
English and German forms, they have no further in-
struction for us and need not be quoted.
What now was the real meaning of this neuter
noun which our remote ancestors upon becoming
Christian found most available as an equivalent of the
Greek o tieoz, and the Latin dens I It is to be remem-
bered that the real meaning of these words was not
apparent, in fact is not known with certainty even
now. Deus is quite likely the same word as the San-
skrit deva, ' a god,' and that may come from div, ' the
sky'; but the alleged root div, 'to shine,' which has
played such an important role in the literature of this
subject does not exist. As for Wfo;, it very certainly
has nothing to do with deus, and no satisfactory ety-
mology of it has been proposed. How then were the
Germanic tribes upon becoming Christian to express
o 6eoS in their language ? They had their gods, but
none of their familiar divine names were available, and
we may doubt if they had reached anything corres-
ponding to the abstraction o Hso^, which had first
been worked out by the Greek philosophers, and was
then taken from their language into the Greek of the
New Testament instead of Jehovah, Adonai, Elohim,
or any of the older Hebrew names. We find that
what they did was to take their neuter noun gud/i and
treat it as a masculine. What did this word mean ?
A Germanic neuter gud/i would correspond to an
ideal Indo-European ghu-td-m. and such a word, if it
ever existed, would appear in Sanskrit in the form
hutani, in Greek as ju-ro-i'. Now we actually find in
Sanskrit a root hu meaning ' to pour or cast into the
fire,' 'to offer as sacrifice.' Hutam means 'oblation,'
'sacrifice,' with which is to be compared the Greek
XV-ro-Z, 'poured' and ^y-ffi-b, 'pouring.' This cer-
tainly does not help us much, but let us look a little
further. While the Germanic gudh has a short vowel,
we can not be sure that that quantity was primitive ;
it may have been shortened from a long vowel as has
happened in other cases. In other words it might come
from a proethnic Indo-European ghTi-io-m, which in
turn would give a Sanskrit hii-tiiin. And now light ap-
pears. We actually find in common use in Sanskrit a
root hu, having the meaning to 'call on,' 'invoke';
hJitam means 'thing invoked,' 'object prayed to.'
Thus it is to be regarded as highly probable that
the word "God," notwithstanding all the exalted as-
sociations that have gathered about it in the process
of the ages, goes back to a period when our Germanic
ancestors worshipped stocks and stones.
DISCOVERIES OF THE VEDA BY THE CHINESE, PER-
SIANS, CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES AND SCHOLARS.*
BY PROFESSOR F MAX MULLER.
The first people who give us authentic information
about the Veda are the Chinese. There exists a curi-
ous prejudice against the Chinese. We do not look
upon them exactly as they look upon us as ' Outer
Barbarians.' But we find it very difficult to take them,
as the French say, au grand sericux. They seem to
us queer, funny, not quite like other people—cer-
tainly not like Greeks and Romans, not even like
Indians and Persians. And yet when we examine
their literature, whether ancient or modern, it is by
no means so very different from that of other nations.
Their interests are much the same as ours, and there
is certainly no lack of seriousness in their treatment
* From a Report in the London Christian World, copies of which were
kindly sent us by Prof. Max MOller.
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of the highest problems of religion, moralit)', and
philosophj'.
There are in China three religions, that of Con-
fucius, that of Laotza, and that of Buddha. Confucius
and Laotze lived both in the sixth century, b.c. They
were, however, restorers rather than founders of re-
ligion. The religion of Buddha reached China from
India about the beginning of our era. These three
religions have had their controversies, and their hos-
tile conflicts. But all three are now regarded as re-
cognized systems of faith in China, and the Emperor
of China is expected to profess all three, and to at-
tend their special services on great occasions.
Here we are at once inclined to smile, and to
doubt the seriousness of a religious faith that could
thus conform to three systems so different from each
other as Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. We
pride ourselves on attending the services of none but
our own sect or subdivision of the great divisions of
Christendom. We are apt to suspect indifference,
latitudinarianism, or scepticism in any member of the
Church of England attending the communion of any
other Christian sect. But the official attendance of
the Emperor of China in the temples of Confucianists,
Taoists, and Buddhists admits of a very different in-
terpretation also. May it not show that the wisest of
their statesmen had recognised that there was some
truth, some eternal truth, in everj' one of these three
religions : that the amount of truth on which they all
agreed was much greater and much more important
than the points of doctrine on which they differed,
and that the presence of the Emperor at the sacrifices
of the three religions of his subjects, was the most
efficient way of preaching tolerance, humility, or, if
you like, Christian charity. We are but too ready to
judge heathen nations without considering how much
of charitable interpretation we have to claim for our
own acts.
How serious a Chinaman can be about his religion
you will be able to gather from the lives of those
Buddhist pilgrims to whom we owe the first authentic
account of the Veda. Why did these pilgrims go from
China to India—a journey which, even now, is con-
sidered by geographical explorers as one of the most
perilous, and, as requiring no less of human endurance
and bravery than Stanley's exploration of Africa? They
went there for the sake of their religion. India was
to them their Holy Land. Buddhism had reached
China at the beginning of our era from Northern
India, and to visit the holy places where Buddha had
been born, had lived, taught, and died, was as much
the dream of a devout Buddhist in China as to visit
the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem was the dream of
many a poor palmer and many a valiant Crusader in
Christendom.
We possess the descriptions of these Buddhist
pilgrimages, extending from about 400 a.d. to 1000
A. D. The most important are those of Fahian,
399-414, Hiouen-thsang, 629-645, and I-tsing, 673-695.
Their works have been translated into French and
into English, too, b}' Stanislas Julien, Professor Legge,
Dr. Beal and others. I shall give j'ou a short account
of one of these pilgrims, Hiouen thsang, partly be-
cause he bears witness, not only to the existence of
the Veda, but to the influence which at that time the
Veda still exercised in India
;
partly because his life
shows better than anything else how serious these
Chinese can be when their religion is at stake.
While the companions of Alexander had no eyes
to see the existence of sacred books, such as the Veda
in India, the Chinese pilgrims not only gave us the
name of the Veda, but they actually learnt Sanskrit,
and they were able to point out the differences between
the literarj' Sanskrit and the more ancient Sanskrit
used in the Veda.
Hiouen-thsang undertook a pilgrimage to recover
the " Law which was to be a guide to all men and the
means of their salvation." After overcoming almost
insuperable difficulties, the pilgrim at length reached
India. Shortly after he heard of an extraordinary
cave where Buddha had formerly converted a dragon,
and had promised his new pupil to leave him his sha-
dow, in order that whenever, the evil passions of his
dragon-nature should revive, the aspects of his mas-
ter's shadowy features might remind him of his former
vows. Although the road leading to the cave was in-
fested with robbers, Hiouen-thsang resolved to see it,
remarking, 'It' would be difficult during a hundred
thousand Kalpasto meet one single time with the true
shadow of Buddha ; how could I, having come so
near, pass on without going to adore it?' The pil-
grim easily overcame the bandits whom he met, and
after offering many prayers in the cave he was at last
rewarded by seeing the shadow of Buddha, a dazzling
splendor lighting up the features of the divine coun-
tenance. When Hiouen-thsang returned to his native
land, he carried with him, among other trophies, a
collection of 657 works in 520 volumes, to the trans-
lation of which he devoted the remainder of his life.
At the approach of death, he- had all his property
divided among the poor, and then took farewell of
his friends with the words : "I desire that whatever
rewards I may have merited by good works may fall
upon other people. May I be born again with them
in the heaven of the blessed, be admitted to the family
of Mi-le, and serve the Buddha of the future who is
full of kindness and affection."
The world owes to Al-Biruni—a learned astrono-
mer and astrologer who was carried off from India
about 1000 A. D. by Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni—the
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first accurate and comprehensive account of Indian
literature and religion. In 1795 a Persian translation
of the Upanishads, the philosophical appendices of
the Vedas, was rendered into Latin by Anquetil Du-
perron, and it was that translation which inspired
Schopenhauer, and furnished to him, as he himself
declares, the fundamental principles of his own phi-
losophy.
Nothing shows more clearly the indefatigable in-
dustr)', and at the same time the wonderful perspicuity
of that great philosopher, than his being able to find
his way through the labyrinth of uncouth Latin, and
to discover behind the strangest disguises the sublime
truths hidden in the Upanishads. Honest man that
he was, Schopenhauer declared that his own philos-
ophy was founded on that of the Upanishads. " From
every sentence of these Upanishads," he writes,
"deep, original, and sublime thoughts arise, and the
whole is pervaded by a high and holy and earnest
spirit. Indian air surrounds us, and original thoughts
of kindred spirits. And oh, how thoroughly is the
mind here washed clear of all early engrafted Jewish
superstitions, and of all philosophy that cringes be-
fore those superstitions ! In the whole world there is
no study, except that of the originals, so beneficial
and so elevating, as that of the Upanishads. It has
been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my
death."
You see here again how thought is continuous,
how, when it seems to disappear, it is still there ; and
how what has once been thought and expressed in
powerful language, will go on and on in different forms
and produce some good, and lead us nearer step by
step to what we are all anxious for—the possession of
truth.
At the court of Aurungzebe, 1658—1707, there
were several European missionaries who took part in
the religious and philosophical discussions of the time,
and who ought to have been acquainted with the Ve-
das, if only by name. But it would seem as if the
Brahmans were anxious to keep their sacred literature
out of sight of any strangers. It was only when
Christian missionaries began themselves to learn the
classical language of the Brahmans, the so-called
Sanskrit, that they became aware of the existence of
the old sacred books, called the Vedas. We have a
letter from Father Calmette, written from the South
of India in January 1733, in which that missionary
stated that his friends were not only well-grounded in
Sanskrit, but were able to read the Veda. Father
Calmette was evidently quite aware of the importance
of a knowledge of the Vedas for missionar}' purposes,
and of the immense influence which the Vedas con-
tinued to exercise on the religious convictions of the
people.
After Father Calmette had got actual possession of
the Vedas, and had succeeded, with the help of some
Brahmans, in deciphering some chapters, it is most in-
structive to watch the bent of his thoughts, and of the
thoughts of man)' of the early missionaries in India.
He is not bent on extracting from the Vedas passages
showing the depravity and absurdity of the ancient
Indian religion, an occupation which some of our
present missionaries seem to consider their principal
duty. No; the very contrary. "Since the Veda is
in our hands," he writes, " we have extracted from it
texts which serve to convince them of those funda-
mental truths that must destroy idolatry ; for the unity
of God, the qualities of the true God, and a state of
blessedness and condemnation, are all in the Veda.
But the truths which are to be found in this book are
onl)' scattered there like grains of gold in a heap of
sand.
"
What would some of the present Bishops in India
say to this trulj' Pauline sentiment, to this attempt to
discover in the sacred books, of other nations some
grains of gold, some common ground, on which a
mutual understanding and a real brotherhood might
be established between Christians and non-Christians?
The Brahmans themselves are quite aware of the
existence of these grains of gold, and when accused
of polytheism and idolatry, they themselves quote cer-
tain verses from the Vedas to show that even in an-
cient times their prophets knew perfectly well that the
different gods invoked for different blessings were only
different names of the Supreme Being. Thus they
quote from the Rig-Veda : ' They call Indra, Mitra,
Varuna, Agni, then there is that heavenly Garutmat
with heavenly wings. The One that they speak of
in different ways, they call Agni, Yama, and Mata-
risvan.'
This is a clear confession, if not of monotheism,
at least of monism, for it should be remarked that the
\'edic poet, when he speaks of the One that trul}'
exists, the bearer of many Divine names, does not
even venture to put it in the masculine gender, but
calls it the Ekam Sat, the only Being that exists.
Another well-known verse of a similar character is the
following :
" He n-ho is our father that begot us, he who is the creator,
He who knows all places a':d all creatures,
He who gave names to the gods, being one only.
To him all other creatures go, to ask him."
How strong a desire had been awakened in Ger-
many for a real and authentic knowledge of the Veda,
I learnt from my dear old friend, Bunsen, when I first
made his acquaintance in 1846. He was then Prus-
sian minister in London. He told me that, when he
was quite a young man, he had made up his mind to
go himself to India to see whether there really was
such a book as the Veda, and what it was like. But
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Bunsen was then a poor student at Gottingen, poorer
even, I believe, than the poorest student in England
or Scotland. What did he do to realize his dream?
He became tutor to a young and very rich American
gentleman, well-known in later life as one of the
American millionaires, Mr. Astor. Instead of ac-
cepting payment for his lessons, he stipulated with the
young American, who had to return to the United
States, that they should meet in Italy, and thence pro-
ceed together to India on a voyage of literary dis-
covery. Bunsen went to Italy, and waited and waited
for his friend, but in vain. Mr. Astor was detained
at home, and Bunsen in despair had to become pri-
vate secretary to Neibuhr, who was Prussian minister
at Rome. BriUiant as Bunsen's career became after-
wards, he always regretted the failure of his youthful
scheme. " I have been stranded, " he used to say,
•'on the sands of diplomacy; I should have been
happier had I remained a scholar." This was the ori-
gin of my own friendship with Bunsen. When I
called on him, as Prussian minister, to have my pass-
port vise in order to return to Germany, and when I
explained to him how I had worked to bring out an
edition of the text and commentary of the Rig-Veda
from MSS. scattered about in different libraries in
Europe, and was now obliged to return to Germany
unable to complete my collection and copies of manu-
scripts, he took my hand and said, 'I look upon you
as myself, young again. Stay in London, and as to
ways and means, let me see to that.' Mind, I was
then a young, unknown man. Bunsen had never seen
me before. Let that be a lesson to young men never*
to despair.
Historical justice requires that Burnouf's merits
should be fully recognized, because, owing to his be-
ing called away to Buddhistic studies, and owing to
his early death, very little of his work on the Veda has
come to the knowledge of the world, except through
his disciples. First of all, Burnouf worked hard in
collecting manuscripts of the principal Vedas, of their
commentaries, and of other works necessary for their
elucidation. He had persuaded Guizot, who was then
Prime Minister in France, to provide the funds neces-
sary for the acquisition of these manuscripts ; others
he had acquired at his own expense. With the help
of these manuscripts he gained a wider acquaintance
with Vedic literature than was possessed at that time
by any other scholar. There can be no question
whatever, that the founder of the critical school of
Vedic scholarship was Burnouf, though he himself was
the very last man to claim any credit for what he had
done.
I had come to Paris to attend Burnouf's lectures,
and with very vague notions as to an edition of the
text and the commentary of the Rig-Veda. You must
remember that the Vedas had never been published in
India, though for more than three thousand years they
had held there the same place which the Bible holds
with us. They existed in oral tradition, as they still
exist, and in manuscripts, more or less perfect, more
or less correct. These manuscripts therefore had to
be copied, and then to be collated. This was com-
paratively an easy task. The real difficulty began
with the commentary. First of all, that commentary
was enormous, and filled about four volumes quarto of
a thousand pages each. While the manuscripts of
the text were generally correct, those of the commen-
tary were mostly very carelessly written, full of omis-
sions, and often perfectly unintelligible. But the
greatest difficulty of all was that Sayana, the com-
piler of the great commentary, who lived in the four-
teenth century, quoted largely from a literature which
was at that time entirely unknown to us, which ex-
isted in manuscripts only, and often not even in manu-
scripts accessible in Europe. My idea was to give
extracts only from this commentary, but on this point
Burnouf resisted with all his might. We must have
the whole or nothing, he used to say, and often, when
I despaired of my task, he encouraged me and helped
me with his advice.
Before I could begin the first volume of my edi-
tion of Sayana's commentary I had to read, to copy,
and to index the principal works which were constantly
referred to by Sayana—a little library by itself. How-
ever in 1849 the first volume appeared, and twenty-
five years later, in 1875, the whole work was finished.
THE ETHICAL IMPORT OF DARWINISM.
BY L. J. VANCE.
ICONCLUDED.]
Now, what are natural morals ? By natural ethics
we mean those morals which are deducible from the
uniform course of Nature and of consciousness in our
fellow-men. Natural morals are so called because
they are in sharp contrast to supernatural morals.
The evolutionist would strip from the moral senti-
ments that artificial glamour by which they have been
surrounded by generations of "trained experts," and
theologians. They would show that in place of being
a simple social instinct, the moral sense is the most
complex; that, instead of being put into man's heart
in some supernatural way, it has come as a normal
and natural product of human development. More-
over, how would Prof. Schurman prove that the "de-
liverances " of conscience, developed from the social
instincts of apes, were not as strict and stringent as
any developed from the feelings and passions of fallen
angels ? In any event the present deliverances of con-
science would remain sacred and inviolate. The Dar-
winist admits that often conscience moves in a mys-
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terious way its wonders to perform, but that way must
be the natural way. The moral sense is natural when
it follows natural laws ; and because we do not know
what those laws fully are—that is no valid reason for
making a supernatural system of ethics. If the anal-
ogies of natural law can be carried into the moral world,
then that domain at once comes under the reign of
law. In truth, moral laws are not merely analogous
to natural laws, but they are the same laws. It thus
becomes not a question of analogy, but of identity.
I am aware that this view of natural morals raises
the metaphysical bugbear of free-will. This, however,
does not bother the evolutionist, who looks the meta-
physical monster fairly in the face. And we are pleased
to note that so able, and fair-minded an evolutionist as
Prof. E. D. Cope has stated both sides of the free-
will controversy in a singularly lucid manner. "It has
been said that the operation ordinarily called choosing,
in which the will is popularly supposed to be free, con-
sists merely of a sum in addition and subtraction, where
various inducements are balanced, the resultant pre-
ponderance being expressed in the act. It will be easily
seen that while this statement is true in regard to cases
where the elements of the calculation are known, it is
not true where any or all of them are unknown. . . .
"It is evident that occasions must arise in human ex-
perience where a decision between two alternatives is
dependent on choice alone. That these occasions have
arisen, and the choice been made is shown by the ex-
istence of the altruistic class of actions," (p. 451-53).
Here, however, is the frequent conclusion. "Each
man," says Prof. Cope, "must learn the merits of
different courses of action in regard to morals for him-
self ; his intelligence places before him the facts, and
shows him how to execute his wishes, but the state of
his affections determines the direction of his acts.
Intelligence is the condition of the perception of moral
truth ; in other words, intelligence as applied to moral
questions, is the conscience. Consequences of acts are
understood, and their relations to pleasures and pains
of men are weighed. . . . That it has improved in the
practice of right has not been due to the inheritance
of respect for law, but to the self-destructive nature of
wrong. That continued wrong sooner or later ends
in destruction of the wrong-doer, either from within or
without, must be generally admitted. Thus is the
truth of the doctrine of the Survival of the Fittest
vindicated in moral as in natural law."*
This view of the ethical import of Darwinism has
been entirely overlooked by Professor Schurman. In
his eagerness to make a point against Mr. Darwin and
"his school," I do not find that anywhere he has met
the "gratuitous" assumption, namely—that the first
principles of morality were hardily won in the struggle
* " Origin of the Fittest," p. 458.
for existence. From the Darwinist's point of view
there can be no morality apart from society. As soon
as men began to learn the difficult art of living to-
gether ; as soon as they understood the prime neces-
sity of organizing and combining for mutual preserva-
tion and protection ; as soon as the feeling and habit
of comradeship were developed,—so soon would the
idea of mcum and tuum arise,—so soon would the
sense of right and wrong be acquired. And this is
morality, pure ct simple. Thus the moral instincts grew
up naturally out of the common interests and feelings
of human beings living together in society. Now, ob-
serve : the moral instincts could never have been the
exclusive possession of one man, but they are the em-
bodiment of the memories and experiences of thou-
sands and thousands of men. Thus it is that in the
matter of moral feelings we are 'the heirs of the ages,'
and 'foremost in the files of time.' Or, as Maudsley
well puts it, if the moral sense were not more or less
innate in the well-born individual of this age, if he
were obliged to go, as the generations of his forefathers
have gone, through the elementary process of acquir-
ing it, he would be very much in the position of a per-
son, who, on each occasion of writing his name, had
to go through the elementary steps of learning to do so.
Prof. Schurman is no more successful in his at-
tempt to refute Darwin's argument that the social in-
stincts are more present and enduring than the selfish
instincts. He simply tries to break its force by say-
ing that "our hypothetical ancestor" must have per-
ceived the social instincts as higher than the selfish
instincts (p. 200). Yet that does not explain, says he,
"why I feel remorse over acts of vengeance or rob-
bery." Prof. Schurftian should read Browning. In
Christmas Eve he will read :
' Whom do you count the worst man upon earth ?
Be sure, he knows in his conscience, more
Of what Right is, than arrives at birth
In the best man's acts that we bow before."
Ne te qiimseveris extra. Now, Prof. Schurman would
have us believe that the Darwinist is here speaking
dire treason against the "undeniable deliverances" of
conscience. Not so; on the contrary Darwinism in-
vests the moral sense with a higher and greater dig-
nity than before.
Consequently we may rightly inquire. What possi-
ble difference can it make to us whether conscience is
derivative, or whether it is intuitive? The great fact
stands out that conscience is what it is. The moral
sense of mankind remains the same on any theory.
Its "deliverances," when born of earth, are just as
binding as if they came from some celestial source.
In foro conscieniia: every man is bid to
" Follow right
Mere wisdom in the scorn of consequence."
In the presence of a Power, not ourselves, which
23.12 THE OREN COURT.
makes for righteousness, each one of us hears the still,
small voice of Man, commanding us to work for Man.
Thus, it is one of the many great services rendered
by Mr. Darwin to the study of ethics that he has
taught the indissoluble dependence of man upon man
as a scientific verity. The social relation is as constant
as that of oxygen and hydrogen. Men can only thrive
through universal good-will; they deteriorate through
ill-will. Thus, the Darwinist would throw the whole
burden of human redemption upon man, and upon
man alone. He would take for granted that in the
struggle for existence men will find out that the social
instincts are superior to selfish instincts. Finally, he
would hold that man, like Faust, "Through obscurest
aspiration has still an instinct of the one right way."
But above all, the great import of Darwinism is its
moral optimism. I am aware that this view of the
evolution of morality has been vigorously combatted
by the anonymous author of "Conflict in Nature and
Life." From his point of view, morality is 'taking
such direction as meets with the fewest damaging
blows.' It is 'the aggregate result of utilitarian ad-
justment in the midst of complicated conflict'; and
that is the reason wh)' altruism is superior to hedon-
ism (p. i6o). Thus we learn that the true philosophy
of ethics is neither optimism nor pessimism, but what
the ingenious author calls 'the Middle Way' (p. 485).
Whether we call this view of life the Middle Way, or
the Mean, or Meliorism, the author frankly confesses
that his philosophy is simply 'a return, with some
improvement, to the good old doctrine of the Stoics.'
But, for the thorough-going Darwinist there is
—
there can be—no Middle Way in morals. He sees
that, even if the doctrine of Conflict be true, pleasure
and happiness do not come by any middle wa}^
Granting, that "happiness and pleasure can only be
had by paying their price," he is loath to believe that
the price consists in 'taking such direction as meets
with the fewest damaging blows.' Happily, there is
a law of our nature by which we follow right "mere
wisdom in the scorn of consequence." Thus it is that
general happiness is to be achieved by the price paid
by individual right doing, while the happiness of in-
dividuals will be achieved in part by the pursuit of
the general happiness. According to Spinoza, "Noth-
i ig is more useful to Man than Man ; men can de
.
sire nothing more excellent for their welfare than that
all should so agree in all things that the minds and
bodies of all should make up, as it were, one mind
and one body, and all together strive to maintain
their welfare to the best of their power, and all to-
gether seek the common good of all. Therefore, rca-
soiiable men desire no good for themselves which they
do not also desire for other men."*
* Ethics IV, Schol. 18,
Here our criticism of Prof. Schurman's contribution
to the ethical import of Darwinism comes to an end.
We have not hesitated to show that, where he has not
been unfair to Mr. Darwin's theory of ethics, he has
either overlooked or mistaken its import. We do not
take up the cudgels in behalf of a " school " of morals
;
that is another question. We do not know the
" school " of ethics to which Prof. Schurman claims to
belong. He has, very rightly, divided ethical students
into two classes—the dogmatists of the schools, and
the open-minded, fact- revering inquirers. The latter
he calls ' the true heirs of Darwin,' (p. 38). We leave
it with his readers to decide as to which of the two
categories Prof. Schurman would most properly be
classed.
THE SCIENCE OF ETHNOLOGY.*
ITS HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND METHOD.
BY DR. TH. ACHELIS.
Apart from the Aristotelian statement of the prob-
lem in the well-known phrase ''ocvdpoonoS q)vaEi8,<S)ov
ndkiriuov" substantially correct, although from the na-
ture of the case not further practicallj^ elaborated—we
do not meet with the idea of a science of mankind that
ventures beyond the conventional ground of so-called
Universal History until the Eighteenth Century, in
that philosophy of enlightenment which despite its
narrowness was so productive of germinal principles.
Herder, particularly, pointed out the importance
of the question—an ideal for his time, and apparently
realizable only in the transports of enthusiasm. In
the preface to his work Ideas for a History of Man-
kind, he saj's : "In my earlier years, when the
meadow-lands of science lay before me in all the
resplendence of early morn from which the noon-day
sun of life withdraws so much, the thought often oc-
curred to me, since everything on earth has its science
and philosophy, should not that too have a science and
philosophy which touches us most nearl}'—the his-
tory of mankind in its unity and totality?"
"Just one hundred years have passed awa}' in the
stream of time," saj'S Bastian in a little brochure, A
Centenary, "since one of Germany's most gifted sons
spoke those prophetic words, idealistically conceived
at the time, yet now about to be realized. In his
Ideas for the Philosophy of a History of Mankind,
Herder has given expression to a thought which is
now, a century later, to receive its inductive fulfill-
ment through Ethnology as the science of man. The
God in history that was sought, will be found in Man
in History."
The penetrating mind of Schiller also marked out
with equal precision the exalted mission of a com-
prehensive philosophy of history. In his well-known
Translated from the Deutsche Ruiuhchau by fUipK.
THE OPEN COURT. 23^3
Academical Inaugural Address at Jena, JJVtaf /s, and
Why do we Study Universal History, he deplores the
manifold gaps in the continuity of human knowledge,
and after asserting that the disjecta membra of uni-
versal history would never merit the exalted title of a
science, he says : " Philosophy now comes to its as-
sistance, links together these fragments by artificial
bonds, and raises the aggregate to a system, to a ra-
tional and connected whole. Philosophy's authority
for this lies in the uniformity and immutable unity of
nature's laws and human character. This unity is the
reason that the occurrences of remotest antiquity re-
peat themselves under similar external conditions in
most recent times ; it is this that sanctions the infer-
ences drawn from the observable conditions of modern
times to those which lose themselves in the past, and
it is this that enables us to shed some light upon the
prehistoric epochs of antiquity. The method of in-
ference from analogy is in. history as everywhere a
powerful auxiliary." The most essential means of
proof, as later developed in the exact method, are
here discerned a priori and with striking precision.
This is particularly true of the inferential method as
developed by Tylor in his theory of " survivals."
Finally, towards the end of the last century, Mei-
ners, in his "Encyclopedia of the Sciences," laid
particular stress upon this universal phase of a his-
tory of the human race. "All other departments of
history, as the history of arts, sciences, and great in-
ventions, exhibit only certain phases of humanit}', or
portray only individual aspects and separate epochs
;
the history of mankind alone comprehends all of man,
as constituted at all times and in all parts of the
earth."
Yet howsoever pointedly and frequently the funda-
mental and essential ideas of this future science had
been formulated, the efforts at practical realization
nevertheless fell short of the ideal conceived. For not
only did such disturbing factors as the tendencies of
asstheticism and of the history of civilization (partic-
ularly the morbid and sentimental craze for peoples
in a state of nature) interfere with the objective
treatment of the subject, but there was also a great
dearth of necessary material. The difficulty could
not be remedied until discoveries were made that led
to a systematic classification of data; a work accom-
plished in the different museums of France, England,
and America, towards the middle of the present cen-
tury. In Germany political dismemberment left all
to the enterprise of individual effort ; in 186 1 in Got-
tingen the Congress of Anthropologists was convened at
the call of the celebrated naturalist, K. C. \on Baer
;
in 1859 was published the remarkable epoch-making
work of Th. Waitz, entitled Naturvolker ; and finally
appeared the first effort of Bastian, Man in History,
with the insignificant addition A Contribution to the
Establisluncnt of a Psychological View of the World,
published after the author's return to Europe from his
first journej' abroad, of seven years duration.
The movement had now been started. The term
Anthropology, which formerlj'had sounded so strange,
and had been chiefly employed to designate an indis-
criminate collection of interesting curiosities, rapidly
began to gain the rights of citizenship, and after Bas-
tian, in 1868, had assumed the control of the ethno-
logical department of the ro3'al museums at Berlin,
the Zeitschrift fiir A?ithropologie, Ethnologic, und Ur-
geschichte (Review of Anthropology, Ethnology, and
Primeval History), was started in i86g, under the edi-
torial management of Hartmann, Virchow, and Bas-
tian, and in 1870 the society of the same name was
organized at Berlin. By the side of the latter stands
the German Anthropological Society of Mainz, whose
productions are published under the editorial direc-
tion of Prof. Joh. Ranke, in the Archiv fiir Anthro-
pologic.
Of the many different sources and causes of this
great movement, Bastian makes especial mention of
the following : " The first cooperation came after the
founding of the African Society, in the shape of in-
structions given to its travellers, as well as in the sim-
ilar practice of the Humboldt and Ritter foundations
;
then—an inexhaustible source—from the activity of
the German navy, the contributions of which (espec-
ially those from the tropical seas now in the National
Museum), are of extraordinary value ; further by
means of circulars to consulates, through contribu-
tions from missionary posts and from countrymen en-
gaged in commerce and other occupations with the
outside world. So that, after the completion of the new
Museum, when these embodiments of the spirit of the
nations will have been disclosed in systematically ar-
ranged collections, deep vistas into new worlds of in-
tellectual life will open on every side to those who
pass among them. The sudden change that has been
inaugurated in favor of Anthropology and Ethnology
is most profoundly felt by those who have lived
through it. But a short time ago it was scarcely
known, seldom mentioned, and if so, not understood.
Its name is now on everybody's tongue, and Anthro-
pology, especially, boasts of the favor of high patron-
age ; for our science must in great part attribute the
successes we have noted, to the support of the Im-
perial. Admiralty and the countenance of the Foreign
Office whose powerful influence has aided it in many
ways."*
As a final illustration of the comparatively rapid
change of public interest with regard to the great
problems of Ethnology, we may mention that in 1870
*Vorgeschii:hte der Ethnologie, p. 51.
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the Berlin society alone existed in Germany, and that
its only rivals in Europe were to be found in Paris
and London, whereas now besides the Berlin society
and those afterwards founded (in Munich, Kiel, and
Gottingen) there are some five and twenty branches
in different parts of the empire.
Having thus given a sketch of the external devel-
opment of our science, we come now to an exposition
of the method that Ethnology follows. A preliminary
remark, however, will first be necessary in order to
answer objections which have been raised from an
historical point of view. History usually presupposes
civilization ; our science, on the contrary, aims to ex-
hibit the gradual evolution of civilization from the
scantiest and simplest germs, and thus to draw in these
forms of social organization a comprehensive picture
of the human mind in its most multiform processes of
development. Accordingly, those very tribes that from
a strict historical point of view have )io history, or at
least no literary history, constitute the subjects of
ethnological investigation. And Ethnology therefore
does not dispute the glory of her elder, and in many
ways maturer, sister. With all becoming modesty
Ethnology merely asks for indulgent toleration. Geo-
graphically, the earth would be thus divided between
the two rival sciences. All of Oceanica would fall to
Ethnology; also America before its contact with Euro-
pean civilization, and the greater part of Africa ; iso-
lated portions of Asia; and Europe in the prehistoric
period. All the rest belongs to history.
Although from an unprejudiced stand-point no last-
ing conflict can occur between the two departments of
investigations, this difference in method will necessa-
rily assert itself, and indeed this is so much the case
that historians for this very reason frequently hesitate
to admit Ethnology into the rank of the other sciences.
Let us turn to Bastian again. "The Mission of Eth-
nology," he says, ' ' will be to corroborate in the field of
investigation assigned to it, the inductive process of
historical research (in the broadest conception of a
history of mankind), and to facilitate the opening of
the roads which are necessary to its pursuit. For,
though the study of comparative psychology begins
with the lowest and simplest forms of ethnic ideas in
order to determine in the more transparent simplicity
of these facts the elements that go to make up the
fundamental laws, a thread of guidance is thereby
furnished which, even amid the labyrinthine mazes of
the complicated creations of civilization, promises to
brmg about a gradual elucidation."*
Psychology, therefore, the creator of our modern
conception of the world, forms, at the same time, the
basis of Ethnology; and the latter thus acquires the
distinctive character of a connective link between the
* Vorgeichichte, p. 60.
philosophical and the natural sciences. Yet there is
one thing which must not be forgotten. While up to
our day the study of psychology has been chiefly pur-
sued upon a purely speculative, or at least individual,
basis, there is now pouring in through the intimated
prospect of a universal comprehension of the human
race in its psychical organization, an infinite amount
of material for investigation. "Psychology," thus
Bastian begins his first treatise, "must not remain
that narrow branch of science which, with the addition
of pathological phenomena, the data of insane asylums,
and general educational facts, is limited to individual
self-observation. Man, as a political animal, finds his
consummation in society alone. Mankind, a concept
which knows none higher than itself, is to be taken as
the starting-point, the unified whole, within which the
single individual figures only as an integrant fraction.
. . . The eye of man glancing back into primitive
times followed the thread of tradition, so long as tra-
dition marked an open path, on to the period of lit-
erature and the origin of writing when tradition could
first be permanently preserved ; and overlooking the
long succession of primitive stages, which the human
mind must have traversed before attaining to the ele-
vation it then occupied, and dazzled by its resplend-
ence, people concluded that the human race originally
existed in a state of primitive wisdom from which de-
generation alone was possible. Thus did history
hitherto exhibit only the course of development of
separate castes instead of the course of development
of mankind. The dazzling light that poured from the
apex of society eclipsed the broad foundations that
lay below it, and yet it is only in the masses beneath
that the productive forces germinate—only in them
that the sap of life circulates. . . . The philosophy of
the inner organic process of growth can be found only
in psychology—and in that psychology which studies
not only the evolution of the individual but also the
evolution of mankind."*
In this conception, accordingly, there is no such a
thing as the single isolated existence of human be-
ings, such as lurks in our popular treatises in the
shape of the primitive man, with the additional poetic
fictions of a period when there existed neither speech
nor reason. As far as experience reaches, man ap-
pears everywhere as a social animal, forced into this
natural and unavoidable relation, to which through
individual reproduction he first owes his psychic indi-
viduality. An atomism of society, such as is again
discernible in English utilitarianism, has no existence
in fact, either morally or mentally. This is especially
true of those prehistoric times of germinating civiliza-
tion which do not know of personalities equipped with
definite moral rights and obligations in our sense, and
* Man in History, Preface, p. 11.
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where strikingl}' communistic features are rather ap-
parent.
To this idea of a comparative, or as the current
technical expression has it, sociological psychology,
Bastian has devoted a separate treatise, Zur Natur-
wissenschaftlichen Behandluiigsivcisc der Psychologic
durch tind fiir die Volkerkunde, from which we wish
to quote a passage or two that especially relate to our
discussion. "In Ethnology," says our author, "the
different conceptions of the world entertained by the
various nations are to be regarded as psychical organ-
isms, as original creations of the soul of ethnic life.
Historical development can here be taken as a factor
only when data in visible succession are at hand ; while
particularly all forms of variation are to be examined,
with reference to their causes as affected by alterations
of environment " (preface p. 15). And again, "Theor-
ganism is contained in the germ. And so in the prim-
itive and germinal elements of the ethnic idea are
contained the various forms of its distribution amid
every sphere of human civilization, in the phenome-
nology of the mind throughout the world."
As was discovered by comparative philolog)' first
in the limited domain of the Aryan peoples, the be-
ginnings of civilization even among nations that differ
fundamentally in character, geographicallocation, and
historical development, bear the most striking resem-
blances to one another ; and we accordingly cannot
reject the inference that the human race, despite all
later differentiation, represents a psychical unit}' which
finds organic expression in the multifarious forms of
religion, custom, law, art, and like manifestations of
social activity.
In opposition to this aspect of psychical homoge-
neity stands now a greater and now a lesser deviation
from the original t3'pe. These deviations ma}' be ar-
ranged within accurately determined topographical
frames, and by thus keeping in view all our available
material we may establish a statistics of the psycho-
logical growth of all peoples of the earth, even to the
most trifling differentiations. The critical method by
analogy and inference, early mentioned by Schiller,
plays a particularly weighty part in this genetic con-
struction of a comparative psychology, and the noted
English investigator, C. Tylor, has turned this to spe-
cial account in his "Primitive Culture." After illus-
trating the cogent power of facts by citing various in-
stances,, and demonstrating the consequent impossi-
bility of a merely subjective and arbitrary explication,
he proceeds to the explanation of ' survivals ' in the
following manner. "These are processes, customs,
opinions, and so forth," he says, "which have been
carried on by force of habit into a new state of society
different from that in which they had their original
home, and they thus remain as proofs and examples
of an older condition of culture out of which a newer
has been evolved. . . . Such examples often lead us
back to the habits of hundreds and even thousands of
years ago. The ordeal of the Key and Bible still in
use is a survival ; the midsummer bonfire is a survival
;
the Breton peasants' All Souls' Supper for the Spirits
of the dead, is a survival. . . . The serious business of
ancient society may be seen to sink into the sport of
later generations and its serious belief to linger on in
nursery folk-lore, while superseded habits of old world
life may be modified into new world forms still power-
ful for good and evil. Sometimes old thoughts and
practices will burst out afresh, to the amazement of a
world that thought them so long since dead or dying
;
here survival passes into revival, as has lately hap-
pened in so remarkable a way in the history of modern
spiritualism, a subject full of instruction from the
ethnographer's point of view."
This reconstruction of original causes from forms
of arrested development still preserved, is after all no
specific prerogative of Ethnology. Although only pos-
sible upon the broad basis of modern inquiry, and
although even here to be used with greatest prudence,
it still rests upon the application of a fundamental law
which has received unqualified recognition in biolog-
ical investigations and acquired universal validity for
all scientific research.
An active laborer in the field of Ethnology, H. Post,
whom we shall meet later in speaking of the develop-
ment of law, has discussed this fruitful method with
great clearness: "The evolutionary origin of the
starry heavens may be determined from their present
structure ; the strata of the crust of the earth disclose
to us the history of our planet; morphology has taught
us to trace in the organic structure of a plant or an
animal the stages it has passed through before it
reached its present point of development ; in the suc-
cessive phases of foetal life we find repeated the main
features of the life of the race ; the story of cerebral
development may, by those who understand those
Runic signs, be interpreted from the structure of the
brain ; the philologist can elicit from human speech
the history of human reason :—and so does the col-
lective status of the human race and the condition of
every single organism encountered in the life of species,
afford definite and accurate material for inferences as
to the story of the human race and to the history of
that single organism."*
It is not the purpose of this essay to confirm this
biogenetic law of all organic phenomena by further
verification. We shall accept it, and we may with all
justice emphasize its validity as bearing upon the com-,
plicated processes of the life of nations. The main
factor is, and remains, a collection of materials which
* Ursf'rting des Rechts, p. S.
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shall unite comprehensiveness and compass in the
greatest possible degree ; and we thus understand why
Bastian, who was himself obliged to witness the ex-
tinction of so many aboriginal tribes, is indefatigable
in impressing this as a first and holy duty upon per-
sons engaged in these researches.
(TO BE CONTINUED.)
CORRESPONDENCE.
NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES.
A LETTER FROM ENGLAND.
To the Editor of The Open Court .•—
I read with interest the article " New Wine in Old Bottles."
The usual way of treating this proverb has always seemed to me
most unsatisfactory. It can only apply in the case of two things
belonging to two ' orders. ' The wine belongs to the vegetable and
the wine-skin to the animal kingdom, or, as glass, to the mineral.
There must be a contrast answering to this, .to make the pro-
verb apply. But it is constantly applied to things really like a
grape and its skin, a drop of water and its skin, or at least like an
insect or snake and its 'sloughed' skin. If the wine- skin were
analogous to the grape-skin, it would expand when needful, as with
the expanding growth of the pulp within. Now language and ges-
ture, symbol, observance, rite, formula, belong to the same order
as the impulses and emotions, thoughts and ideas, beliefs, convic-
tions, and conclusions which evoke them and find expression in
them, are embodied in them,— in short, evolve them as formative
and protective. And that 'skin,' growing with the growth
—
often imperceptible to the continuous observer, except by an effort
of memory and comparison,—of acorn-heart to oak, or embryo to
adult vertebrate, undergoes modification to such an extent that no
doubt its own 'mother,' the organic 'vital' force of the primi-
tive cell, would not know it.
One likes to think of this when cue notes the marvellous in-
consistency of some of us, who disloyally resist the action of this
vital law, and on the one side insist on retaining both the old skin-
word or skin-act of a given stage and its corresponding superficial,
or skin, meaning, neither of which can be stretched to fit its
swelling vigor of inward life and energy ; and on the other, would
have us invent a brand-new skin like a glove or a boot, and rebuke
us sternly for believing that when you come to outline or skin, to
the principle of expression in word, or act, or form, nature's plan
of gradually modifying it with its contents and their functions and
relations, is best.
I own to loving the thought that we carry on all creation, in-
organic or organic, within us. Our brand-new idea or symbol is
mostly an unusually ancient one, with a flood of acquired expe-
rience poured in upon it. v. w.
REAL AND REALITY."
Freelhoiight published in No. 15 a criticism of an article of
mine by " Agnostic," which I should entirely ignore for its obvious
and unjust misrepresentations. Yet considering the fact that it
calls attention to some passages which, although correct, might
easily be misunderstood, I send you a few words in reply. My
anonymous critic possesses my sincere commiseration not only
for his ignorance of the elements of logic, but also for the rude-
ness with which he presents his case. I need not here repeat the
words with which he has—but not, I suppose, with editorial ap-
probation—disgraced the columns of your journal.
My anonymous critic quotes the following sentence : " Mate-
* Reprinted fioin Frccthoitg/tt.
rialism went too far when it tried to explain everything from mat-
ter, when it identified matter with reality. Yet it stands on solid
ground when it maintains that eT.'ery reality is material."
Parenthetically it may be remarked that " Agnostic '.' quotes
the italicized words wrongly. Instead of matter he says "itself,"
and instead of czv/j reality is Diaterial he writes, " every reality is
matter." Such gross misquotations must, of course, make the most
lucid explanations unintelligible.
" Agnostic" declares that the sentence quoted is a contradic-
tion. The sentence does not contain a contradiction, as will be
learned from the following consideration:
Every reality has three elements. First, it consists of matter
;
secondly, its material particles have a special form ; and thirdly,
they are endowed with a certain motion. Matter, form, and mo-
tion are abstracts representing certain qualities that are real
; we
call them " real " because they are qualities of reality. Matter is
real, form is real, motion is real. Yet matter is not all of reality,
nor is form, nor is motion ; for every reality, besides being mate-
rial, possesses at the same time a special form, and is also en-
dowed with some kind of motion.
It is apparent that adjectives have often a wider application
than their nouns. The adjective " real " covers a larger field than
the noun "reality." Thus every fool is foolish, but every thing
that is foolish need not exactly be a fool. I may say, without fall-
ing into a contradiction, this : Space is real ; yet space is not a re-
ality. This, in other words, means : Space is a certain quality of
reality
;
the relations among things, the qualities of things, are ob-
jective properties and not mere subjective illusions
; yet is space
no thingish entity, no tangible object, as concrete bodies are, e. g.,
stones, plants, and animals. Space is non-material, and yet space
is real. If I have the following two premises
:
Every reality is material.
Space is real.
I cannot conclude the syllogism with the statement :
Therefore space is material.
And there is no contradiction involved if I add the sentence :
And yet space is non-material.
My critic would perhaps find no fault with a logician who
concludes from the premises :
All geese are two-legged.
Man is two-legged.
Therefore man is a goose.
I confine myself to this logical exposition without entering on
the discussion as to how far materialism is correct, and how far, as
a philosophy, it is insufficient. P. Carus.
Chicago, April 28, 1S90.
NOTES.
BY GENERAL M. M. TRUMBULL.
Some sarcastic fun is occasionally thrown by thoughtless wits
at those veteran soldiers who get pensions for " mental agony "
suffered in the war. Is the sarcasm just ? Shall physical suffer-
ing win a pension, while mental torture goes unrecognized ? Take
this for illustration. We had a handsome captain in our regiment,
and when he first appeared in his new uniform he was much ad-
mired. In the early summer of '61, we came very close to a fight
near Kirkville, Mo,, so close indeed, that for several hours we
stood in line of battle watching the enemy meandering and
maneuvering to draw us from our favorable position. Failing to
do it, he decided to leave without making any disturbance in the
neighborhood. This was our first meeting with the " boys in gray."
Next day, the handsome captain came to me and said, " I want to
get out of the army " ; I asked him why ; ' 'Because I'm a coward , "
he answered, " I found that out yesterday." I told him that if he
had fairly convicted himself of cowardice, perhaps he ought to
leave. So he sent in his resignation, and we lost him. But he
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was prompt and early on the pension roll, and when his pension
excites criticism as it sometimes does, he justifies it by saying,
'
' Anybody who knows how scared I was at Kirkville, will never
begrudge me a pension." This reasoning appears to be sound
according to the ethics of the pension office ; and many thousands
have the benefit of it ; as indeed, why not ?
Is Nature, in the process of evolution, lengthening the period
of human life ? If so, are all nations getting the benefit of the in-
crease ? If some are favored and others not, what are the reasons
for the partiality ? Are they purely physiological, or are they due
to a strengthening of the spirit through a larger mental education ?
Is it within the power of physics, or of metaphysics, or of both to-
gether, to make a law declaring that from the dawn of the twen-
tieth century, the period of old age shall begin five years later
than it began during the nineteenth century ? And having made
the law, will they be able to enforce it ? I ask these questions
because I notice that some nations, for instance, Germany and
England, have already attempted to extend the time at which old
age may legally begin ; while in the United States, the tendency
appears to be the other way. I have a friend who served with me
in the army, a man who was formerly governor of my State. Last
year he was candidate for commissioner of something or other at
Washington; and indeed he was down on the "slate" for the
place, but gradually his chances grew smaller and smaller, and at
last they vanished altogether under the excuse that " the old man
was too old." He had reached the patriarchal age of sixty-two. This
appears to me to shrivel up the time of American manhood, espe-
cially when I behold Bismarck fretting with impatience because he
has been taken out of the harness at the vigorous prime—for him
—of seventy-five, while Moltke, an older man by a dozen years, is
yet in public life, making great speeches in the Reichstag. Glad-
stone at eighty- one is the active and ambitious leader of a great party
in the House of Commons ; but that is not very wonderful for Eng-
land, because there are several members of the House of Com-
mons who are much older than Mr. Gladstone. They perform all
their parliamentary duties like the other members, and plead not
the privileges of old age. What is the secret of strength preser-
vation for eighty, ninety or a hundred years ? " Tell me Samson
wherein thy great strength lieth." Perhaps the answer will be this :
" Though I am old, yet am I strong and lusty,
For in my youth I never did apply
Hot and rebellious liquors to my blood."
How much of the solution of this problem lies in the hot and
rebellious liquor question ?
This is Decoration day, and the veterans of the great war
seem rather proud than otherwise to accept the immunities of old
age, while the younger generation looks upon us as the venerable
relics of the antediluvian time. We humor ourselves to this kind
flattery, and thereby shorten the period of lusty manhood by a
dozen years or more. I find myself yielding to the temptation,
and labor along with the help of a cane when I am able to march
eight or ten miles elastic and light as I ever did. "Venerable
men," said Daniel Webster, addressing the soldiers of the revolu-
tion assembled at the dedication of the Bunker Hill monument,
" Venerable men." This was appropriate, for the war then was
fifty years past. It will be time enough to call us " Venerable men "
when we can say of the fall of Sumter, " 'Tis fifty years since."
A few days ago I got a late number of the Itluslratcd London
News, and there I found a portrait of Admiral Wallis, a stout old
sailor now serving in the British navy. Since looking at that pic-
ture I feel ashamed to call myself a veteran ; it looks like pre-
sumption to do so. Admiral Wallis was an officer in the navy
and actually fought in the action between the Shannon and the
Chesapeake in 1S13. Although a hundred years of age he is still
on the " active list " of the British navy. He may properly be
called a veteran.
if .»
What does a baby think, is a question that no doubt has puz-
zled most of us when gazing into the inquiring eyes of a philoso-
pher six months old. Poets have speculated on the puzzle in de-
lightful metre but they have not solved it. An equal puzzle is the
question. What does an old man think ? I don't mean an impostor
of sixty-five, or seventy, but a genuine old man, a man of one
hundred years. Does he think that a hundred years of human
life is worth living, and would he live it over again ? Does he
envy the luck of his schoolfellows who died forty cr fifty years
ago, or does he think himself luckier than they ? Has the
world grown in his good opinion through long acquaintance with
it, or otherwise ? Does he look with contempt upon the millions
who started with him and could not stay the distance, or does he
give them credit for having done the best they could ? I never
knew but one man who was over a hundred years old. One day,
when he was a hundred and two, I happened to meet him at the
village market where he had gone to buy something for his din-
ner ; a friendly policeman came along and saluted him ; "Good
morning, Mr. Stiles," he said, " How does a man feel after he has
entered his second century ?" "That all depends, my son," said
the old man, " that all depends upon how he spent the first one."
And I have no doubt that this subjective application of the lesson
of his life largely determines what an old man thinks.
Can we lengthen our own lives ? The supreme test of modern
science will be its answer to that question. Can we lengthen the
period of strong manhood and strong womanhood ? At present a
man is liable to military service up to the age of forty-five. Can
we increase his average vitality so as to raise the limit and make it
fifty years? An officer of the army is retired for "old age " at
sixty-four. Can we not postpone old age till seventy, eighty, ninety,
or even a hundred years ? If one man can live to be a hundred
years old, why cannot another ? During the war I became ac-
quainted with a negro patriarch who was a constant visitor at our
camps where he was much patronized by the soldiers because of
his extreme age, ninety-two years. One day he came to my tent
in great alarm, and wanted to know if there were any new orders
out about " de draft." I told him that I had not heard of any.
" Bekase," he said, " De boys jist been a tellin me dat Marse Lin-
cum done made an order dat eberybody under a hundred years
old is to be drafted into de army." I told him that no such order
had been issued, and that he need not be afraid. But, may not
that be the order some time in the coming centuries, when the
laws of health and life shall be better understood than they are
now ? I don't mean literally, of course, because as ethics grows
with knowledge, when men have learned enough to live healthy
lives for a hundred years, there will not be any drafting into the
army, for wars will be no more.
NOTES.
The Century contains in its June number an article by Mr.
Albert Shaw on the London Polytechnics and People's Palaces.
Tlie Polytechnic is in Regent street, where it flourishes under its
founder, Mr. Quintin Hogg, who is one of the great merchants of
London. There is not the faintest suspicion of the typical philan-
thropist about him, and perhaps that is one reason why his philan-
thropic work has been so singularly successful. He began with
the ' ragged-school ' line of philanthropy. Mr. Hogg appreciated
the lack of opportunities for games and recreations among the
working lads of the metropolis. As a practical man of affairs,
also, he perceived the necessity for systematic instruction to sup-
plement, though not to supersede, the education of the shop. Thus
Mr. Hogg's ragged schools in the Drury Lane neighborhood de-
veloped into a home for boys in which regard was had to every
side of the juvenile nature.
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